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Abstract Serious macroproblems are not a simple result of inflexibilities of prices.
Standard economic theory does not help our understanding of the role of money and
of monetary institutions in disturbed states of the economy. Several examples are
discussed.
1 Introduction
My qualifications for speaking at an ESHIA conference are somewhat doubtful. I am
obviously not an econophysicist and have done no actual agent-based modelling. I
suspect I have been invited because I have been trying to promote work in these areas
for a rather long time. In 1991, with the help of Masanao Aoki, John McCall and
Vela Velupillai, I started a small Center for Computable Economics at UCLA. Quite
a number of young people who later became prominent in Agent-based Economics
gave seminars or attended conferences at CCE. This small Center eventually failed,
however. When Masanao, John and I were induced by the university to take early
retirement, our faculty could not be induced to continue the activity. Agent-based
modelling was not yet reputable in the mid-1990s. As you know, its reputability in
more mainstream quarters remains tenuous even today.
I belong to the last generation of economists who could do theory of sorts without
fairly heavy mathematical equipment and not be laughed out of court for one’s pre-
sumption. I thought the best thing to do with this lecture was to explain to you some of
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the reasons why someone with my background came to promote work of a sort which
I myself am not equipped to pursue.
2 Micro and macro long ago
The story goes back to the relationship between micro and macroeconomics almost
fifty years ago. Macro at that time was “Keynesian” economics. It purported to explain
unemployment. Micro was “price theory”. It purported to explain how markets worked
and how prices were determined. In micro, markets worked to coordinate activities. In
macro, they did not. These two views of how the world works were reconciled, after
a fashion, by the so-called “neoclassical synthesis” which proposed that market econ-
omies generally worked as explained in microeconomics except that prices in certain
markets, and in particular in markets for labor, did not obey the “law of supply and
demand”. Keynesian economics was that special branch of general economic theory
where wages did not decline in response to excess supply.
One problem with this view was that Keynes himself had definitely not assumed
wages to be “rigid” (as it used to be called). But I have to come back to that later.
3 Supply and demand
The first thing a new-comer to economics encounters is likely to be the so-called “law
of supply and demand”. It is a phrase much used or misused and it is not clear what the
so-called law is supposed to mean exactly, although questions of momentous social
and political importance hinge on it. The simplest and probably most ancient version
we recognize as a story of negative feedback control. Let me call it Version 1. Dis-
crepancies between amounts demanded and supplied lead to changes in price which
reduce the discrepancy and, plausibly, equilibrate the market. A great many econo-
mists believe that a system consisting of an arbitrary number of such markets must
surely function in essentially the same way and that, if anything appears to go wrong,
it must be because some sort of interference with the adjustment of prices.
Version 1 has some problems, however. For example, if price initially were such
that supply exceeds demand, what will be the reaction of producers unable to sell what
they had hoped for at that price? We may suppose that they reduce output. Now we
have two adaptive processes going on at the same time. Price moves in response to
excess demand and output moves in response to the discrepancy between market price
and marginal cost. Call this Version 2. It is somewhat less reassuring than the first
version. The two coupled oscillators will produce a non-linear process which need not
converge nicely and could conceivably even be some sort of chaotic monster.
But that is not how markets normally behave. A Version 3 might start from noticing
that Version 2 does not recognize the possibility that output and consumption are not
continuously equal. Unless output is some sort of service that evaporates instantly if not
consumed, the model should include inventories and show how they move over time.
One might think, perhaps, that adding another difference or differential equation to
the little system is likely to make its dynamic behaviour “worse”, but a little reflection
tells us instead that inventory management helps us understand why markets do not
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normally behave as Version 2 would suggest. The inventories act as buffer stocks which
absorb the high frequency oscillations in sales and smooth the time-path of prices. The
middlemen who hold the inventories act as market makers.
Version 3 is a bit better than Version 1, but this does not mean that the whole sys-
tem of interrelated markets can be assumed to behave as a “representative market”
of either Version. One reason is that markets operate on different time scales. It is
only in general equilibrium models that decisions are constrained to be synchronized
so that all prices (for example) are revised every time the time subscript “ticks up”.
In manufacturing, for example, output prices tend to be revised more frequently than
wages.1 Decisions in one market are made on the basis of information produced in
another market.
4 Keynes
Contrary to the neoclassical synthesis, Keynes did not assume that wages were “rigid”
and unresponsive to the state of labor markets. He did assume that they were revised
less frequently than output prices and that average wages moved more slowly than
average prices. But if wages did respond to excess supply of labor, however slowly,
why would not the usual market forces bring the economy to full employment? Some-
thing else than wage rigidity had to be wrong with the system.
What goes wrong, Keynes thought, stems from the fact that goods are not to be
bought by offering goods. It is a monetary, not a barter system we are dealing with.
“Goods buy money and money buys goods but goods do not buy goods” (Clower
1967). In Keynes’s General Theory this leads to two problems.
First, if someone increases his saving today, this means a reduction in the demand
for consumer goods today but no corresponding effective demand at some future date.
It does not by itself send a signal for producers to move resources from the production
of present goods to production of future goods, that is, to invest. However, the saver
will buy a bond or some other interest bearing instruments and this should reduce the
interest rate which is also a signal, albeit less direct, to increase investment. But this
indirect signal may be interfered with. Speculators might stabilize the interest rate, for
example. Keynes in his day blamed the Bank of England for holding the interest rate
too high in order to defend the exchange rate of the pound sterling. The result was too
little investment to absorb saving which meant excess supply in goods markets and
unemployment.2 When unemployment is due to intertemporal prices being wrong,
it will not be cured by falling wages. A rapid decline of wages and prices might in
fact cause waves of bankruptcies and make matters far worse. It is fortunate, there-
fore, that labor markets work on a far different time-scale from exchange markets for
example.
1 At long last we are learning quite a bit about the frequency of price revisions in various types of markets.
For a survey of recent work, see Mac´kowiak and Smets (2008).
2 In recent years, we have had an example of the opposite problem. An extreme low interest policy on
part of the Federal Reserve created asset price inflation, too much investment in housing, and a serious
deterioration in credit standards.
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Keynes’s second problem is that the offer by the unemployed to work is not an
effective demand for consumer goods. So the effect on output of the decline in invest-
ment is amplified by a secondary decline in consumption. This Keynesian multiplier
effect is of particular interest because it brings into economic theory a deviation-
amplifying feedback loop entirely missing from neoclassical theory.
5 Two worldviews
We can now contrast two worldviews, if you will. One views the market system
as entirely self-regulating; all feedback loops are deviation counteracting … and it
is supposed that nothing can go wrong with the world unless there is some sort of
interference with the adjustment of prices. The other, Keynesian view sees the inter-
temporal coordination of saving and investment as a low probability event. And when
it does not happen, deviation amplifying accelerator and multiplier effects take over.
The economy requires the constant exercise of stabilization policy to function at all
efficiently.
These two belief systems are of course inconsistent with one another. Neither one
is plausible. The modern economy is the product of a long evolution. No such system
would malfunction all of the time. Nor would it be completely incapable of malfunc-
tion. The self-regulating capabilities of all systems, whether man-made or natural, are
bounded. The probability that among economic systems we might find an exception
is surely zero.
Consider again the Keynesian multiplier. It is the most strikingly “anti-classical”
property of his system. It assumes, however, that consumption depends closely on
concurrent income. Fifty-some years ago, however, what were then called the “new”
theories of the consumption function of Modigliani and Friedman showed consump-
tion to depend on a slowly moving average of income. Households tend to smooth the
time-path of consumption rather than make it track the fluctuations of their incomes.
This drastically reduces the strength of the deviation-amplifying multiplier3 and makes
it plausible that the deviation-counteracting price mechanisms will dominate the econ-
omy’s response to shocks. The system’s behaviour would be then be more or less
neoclassical.
A hundred years ago, manufacturing workers lived more nearly hand-to-mouth and
consequently seldom had the means to maintain their consumption standard during
periods of unemployment. Today, unemployment compensation schemes buffer them
to a considerable extent and workers in particularly cyclical industries are likely to
be financially prepared for variations in employment. In addition, they may also have
some access to credit. Thus one would expect strong Keynesian deviation-amplifying
effects only in situations when these various buffer stocks were depleted or rendered
in some way inoperable.
These considerations led me many years ago (Leijonhufvud 1973) to propose what
came to be called the “corridor hypothesis”, namely that the system had bounded
3 If the assumptions of the rational expectations hypothesis were to be satisfied, the multiplier would be
even smaller.
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homeostatic capabilities that under “normal” conditions would operate to move it
towards a state where activities were well coordinated. However, if the economy was
propelled outside these bounds, Keynesian properties would come to dominate and the
system’s ability to regain a highly coordinated state would be undermined. This kind
of coordination failure would be unlikely to occur except in the wake of a financial
crisis.
The corridor hypothesis basically implies that severe Keynesian recessions would
be rare events. There is no well-defined statistical distribution for recessions so we can
hardly call such recessions “fat tail” events. But the process which produces a severe
recession of the Keynesian type may still contain a simple lesson for the understand-
ing of such events, namely, that they occur when deviation amplifying feedback loops
come to swamp the negative feedbacks that normally keep the system reasonably well
organized.
6 High inflations
Some years later, I became interested in inflation theory. This interest began with
the growing conviction that the standard inflation theory based on monetary general
equilibrium models surely must be wrong. These models showed some distortion in
resource allocation due to people’s attempt to economize on the holding of money
balances the purchasing power of which was declining. But this was basically the only
source of welfare loss in this kind of theory. It hardly explained the strong aversion to
inflation among people who have to live with it.
You may note that this remains the most widely accepted theory today. Curiously,
it is held by all those economists who would have tight control of inflation be the
exclusive goal of monetary policy. Their theory does not explain why it should matter
very much.
High inflations pose “stress tests”, as it were, of this kind of macro/monetary theory.
My friend Daniel Heymann and I (Heymann and Leijonhufvud 1995; Leijonhufvud
1997) decided on behavioural rather than numerical criteria for categorizing inflations.
An inflation would be classed as “moderate” if people quoted inflation rates in percent
per year, “high” if measured in percent per month, and “hyper” if 30-day estimates
were not considered meaningful. Monetary GE models “flunk” the high inflation stress
test on a number of counts.
It is an often repeated truth that general equilibrium models do not require money,
monetary instruments, or monetary institutions. Money is added on the GE models
by obvious artifice and it is safe to say that no one is satisfied by any of the proposed
tricks for accomplishing it. From the standpoint of such theory, therefore, it is a sur-
prise to find that domestic money stays in use even at inflation tax rates of 2–3,000%
per annum. It does not perform all the functions that a stable money will perform but
it remains in widespread use as an everyday means of payment.
Furthermore, money’s role as a unit of account is not essential even in monetary
general equilibrium models. Any good in the system could serve just as well. In con-
trast, the evidence shows that monetary accounting is essential to the monitoring of
innumerable principal-agents relationships in a modern economy. The stock market
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provides a striking example. At very high and unstable inflation rates, companies
find no way in which to measure their results and to report them in a reliable and
understandable manner to the market. When the market is unable to evaluate company
performance it goes inactive. Trading in the corresponding shares ceases. Although
a variety of accounting and contracting devices are invented during high inflations,
none of them proves a good substitute for a stable money.
Third, the commodity space spanned by markets is invariant to inflation in GE
models. This too is false. Most intertemporal markets, including all bond markets,
simply disappear. The longest maturities denominated in domestic money may be on
the order of 4–8 weeks. At the same time, spot markets fragment. A market economy
has innumerable arbitrage mechanisms that are such everyday phenomena that we
seldom give them any thought. But with prices rising at high and unpredictable rates,
such arbitrage turns into risky speculation and traders withdraw from it. As a conse-
quence, the relative price of the same commodity in different locations—even very
nearby locations—becomes highly variable.
This is an example of a more general phenomenon of high inflations, namely, that
relative prices are far, far more variable than in economies enjoying a fair degree
of monetary stability. Some years ago, numerous papers were written on this sub-
ject. Virtually all of them supposed that this excess relative price variability arose
because, while one set of prices were “flexible” and traced the general inflation
more or less perfectly, another set were subject to “menu costs” and those prices
would adjust only spasmodically. This supposition, I believe, results from the com-
mon prejudice among economists that if anything goes wrong it is because some
prices are “sticky”. The real problem, instead, is that most prices end up far too
“flexible”.
Two rather colourful illustrations from Argentinian experience of about twenty
years ago help explain what is going on. One concerns the extreme volatility of the
exchange rate of the dollar in terms of domestic currency. It would swing by up to
30–40, even 60% from one day to the next. This happened because the large finan-
cial institutions became unwilling to take positions on the rate and instead withdrew
as market makers. All relatively large non-financial firms tried to keep as much of
their liquid assets as possible abroad. When, for example, such a firm would bring
funds back to pay wages in pesos (or australes, as the case may be), the peso would
strengthen abruptly in the absence of a market maker, only to fall equally dramatically
again when some other firm sought to transfer funds abroad.
This example has a counterpart at a more humble level. When the economy reached
the border of hyperinflation, a number of small shop owners in Buenos Aires shut their
shops and posted a sign “Closed for the lack of prices”. (This caused bread riots in
some quarters of the city). These shop owners had most of their capital tied up in their
inventory and had no idea at what prices they might be able to restock tomorrow if
they sold today. So, refusing to speculate any further, they closed shop—which is to
say, they refused to serve as market makers and to let their inventory serve as a buffer
stock for their neighbourhood.
Please note that the disappearance of intertemporal markets, the refusal of market
makers to play their usual roles, and the resulting turbulence in relative as well as
absolute prices are just different aspects of the social adaptation to extreme monetary
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instability. In this process, all prices are exceedingly flexible4—and the result is utter
chaos!
If the authorities are able to reduce the inflation rate and its variability a bit, whole-
salers will be able to quote prices for delivery a few days hence; retailers will post
their prices and stick to those prices for a day or two; consumers will be able to
do some meaningful comparison shopping; prices at different locations will begin to
reflect transportation costs—and a coherent price system with some temporal depth
and some spatial coverage will reemerge. But some “stickiness” of prices is needed
for resource allocation to be at all rational.
7 The thin end of the “Fat Tail”
No one would consider prices on the stock exchanges to be “sticky”. The October 1987
stock market crash illustrates the point that it is relative speeds of adjustment that mat-
ter. I have found Richard Bookstaber’s (2007) account of how the crash was triggered
particularly instructive. The stock market had gone through three consecutive days of
big declines in the week ending Friday, October 16. The managers of portfolio insur-
ance programs started out to reset their dynamic hedges first thing on Monday morning,
October 19. This required selling S&P futures. A massive amount of sell orders flowed
in to the Chicago futures market and the price of futures fell rapidly. Induced by the
widening gap between the current futures price and the Friday closing prices for the
individual stocks, cash-futures arbitrageurs stepped in to buy futures with the intention
of shorting the stocks underlying the S&P index. However, at this point the New York
Stock Exchange had not yet opened. When half-an-hour later NYSE did open it was hit
by a surge of sell orders. The wave hit a wall. The volume was too large for the special-
ists to add to inventory so they tried to find buyers by dropping prices. But the equity
investors initially were not ready to reevaluate their positions that quickly and later on
were frightened off by the very speed with which prices were falling. Thus, concludes
Bookstaber (p. 22), there was “a dislocation between the hair-trigger execution of the
futures and the ponderous decision making on the cash-equity side, compounded by
the insufficient capital of the specialist to bridge the gap…” Rephrasing his point, the
specialists did not have the buffer stock capacity to keep the process orderly so as to
keep it within its “corridor”. The deviation-amplifying process gathered ever more
momentum so that “in the last 75 min of the trading day, the Dow dropped …three
times as much …as it had in any other full trading day in history” (p. 25).
8 Current state of macroeconomics
So far, I have tried to persuade you that general equilibrium theory has failed to inte-
grate money in a meaningful way and that, as a consequence, it fails to explain the
severe coordination failures characteristic of serious depressions and of high infla-
tions. At the same time, I have argued that orderly markets generally require market
4 To be precise, it should be “all the surviving prices are flexible”, since a lot of markets have closed down.
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makers who hold inventories that act as buffer stocks especially against high frequency
shocks and who in this way smooth the path of prices and make them more predict-
able to other market participants. If the buffer stocks are exhausted or if the market
makers withdraw, the result is exceedingly “flexible” prices—but such conditions are
detrimental to the functioning of an economy.
I now want to take this argument a bit further and consider the dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium (DSGE) model which has been considered the State of the Arts in
macroeconomics for quite a few years by now. To be blunt about it, I believe this brand
of macroeconomics is now in serious difficulty. It is of very little (if any) help in trying
to understand our present troubles and it has more than just a little responsibility for
the doctrines of monetary policy and financial regulation that have landed us in these
troubles. People working in this vein are now busy adding inflexibilities, transaction
costs, and whatever other “imperfections” may come to mind in order to bring the
DSGE model in some sort of conformance with the data. Adding epicycles in this
manner signals a degenerating research program. In the process, DSGE is losing all
the clean-cut radical attractions of what was once the New Classical economics. We
are well on our way to a New Neoclassical Synthesis, so help me! This one will be
served up with all the dynamic and stochastic trimmings.
To see what has gone wrong,5 it is helpful to go back a bit and consider some of
the steps by which the profession has arrived at this point.
The Phillips Curve controversy which began in 1967–68 is usually taken to be a
watershed in the development of modern macroeconomics, leading to the defeat of
“old Keynesian” theory and its replacement by New Classical economics. To avoid
misunderstanding, I emphatically agree that the Phillips curve is not stable. Shocks
to the system that set its nominal scale adrift will shift it, of that we can be sure. It is
an elementary error, however, to conclude that this means that “the long-run Phillips
Curve is vertical”.
To see this, start with a point made by Keynes himself. He argued that Ricardo had
arrived at the conclusion that the rate of interest would adjust so as to coordinate saving
and investment over time because he had assumed full employment. In the absence
of full employment, the rate of interest would not settle at its “natural” rate (although
here I am not using JMK’s terminology).
Milton Friedman, in his famous 1967 Presidential address to the American Eco-
nomic Association (Friedman 1968), in effect turned this argument around. He assumed
what Ricardo had concluded and deduced what Ricardo had assumed. He concluded
that flexible wages would produce full employment (the “natural” rate of unemploy-
ment) because he assumed the financial markets would coordinate the intertemporal
decisions of households and firms. If this assumption of Friedman’s is granted, one
would indeed be led to conclude that the long-run Phillips Curve is vertical.
5 Perhaps I should confess from the start that the heterogeneity of agents is not going to play a prominent
role in my account! Of course, lack of attention to heterogeneity is often a serious defect of DSGE models.
But recent events have shown that too many agents trying to do the same thing at the same time can be truly
critical. When all financial institutions try to deleverage simultaneously, for example, the result is a very
deep recession. Destabilizing, positive feedback processes are often of this type. And they are missing in
general equilibrium models.
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It is obvious what Keynes would have answered Friedman, namely, that if planned
saving were to exceed investment at the natural rate of unemployment, flexible wages
will not bring that rate of unemployment about. However, this argument was not
effectively made by Keynesians most of whom were preoccupied with the supposed
inflexibility of wages. Instead both Friedman’s assumption and his conclusion became
embedded in Lucasian monetarism and, after its demise, carried forward by Real Busi-
ness Cycle theory. Rational expectations in fact provide a more “rigorous” basis for
the intertemporal equilibrium assumption than provided by Friedman.
The implications for the labor market are that, given intertemporal equilibrium
prices, the more flexible are wages the better. (Note that in theories in the Wicksell–
Keynes tradition, this is emphatically not true). Also, since the Phillips curve is vertical
at NAIRU, policy should not try to exploit temporary “inflexibilities”.
In financial markets, real rates of interest are determined altogether by real factors,
that is, by intertemporal production possibilities and by intertemporal utility of con-
sumption and by risk aversion (think of representative agent models). The implication
is that the Central Bank has no power over real rates of return. If it tries to set a money
rate of interest different from the equilibrium real rate, i = r*, the result will be a
cumulative Wicksellian inflation or deflation.
The two sets of propositions about the labor market and the financial markets taken
together, Friedman (and later his successors) argued meant that monetary policy should
be exclusively directed to the goal of price stability. In Friedman’s case, this was to
be accomplished by following his money stock growth rate rule. If the money growth
rate is set too high, the money rate will be transitorily too low and inflation will result.
Once expected, of course, the inflation will drive the money rate of interest above the
real rate.
Subsequently, as we all know, financial deregulation and a tsunami of financial
innovations swept away the hitherto fairly stable relationship between the money
stock and nominal income with the result that Friedmanian money growth rules had
to be abandoned.
The new Central Banking doctrine became inflation targeting. The theory that it is
based on might be defined as “monetarism without money”.
9 DSGE in the light of recent events
Inflation targeting is an adaptive operating doctrine. The Central Bank never knows
what is the exact “natural rate” of interest. It is depending on feedback from the behav-
iour of the price level. If it creeps above the target range, Bank rate is too low. In the
opposite case, too high.
This operating doctrine failed in the United States in the 2002–2006 period. The
CPI inflation rate did not move and this misled the Federal Reserve System and made
it maintain the federal funds rate far too low for far too long. The result has been
asset price inflation and a serious deterioration of credit standards, the consequences
of which we are now struggling to contend with.
It is not just the Central Bank’s operating procedures that have failed. The fail-
ure involves also the theory on which the inflation targeting doctrine was based. The
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proposition that the real rate of interest is determined solely by “real” factors and that
the Central Bank cannot affect it is seen to be false.
It is far from the first time that economists have come to rely on an overly simplistic
theory of how the complex economic system works. Once again, it is time to rethink
our monetary theory.
10 Conclusion
The most fascinating problems in macroeconomics to my mind are those indicated by
my title: What are the limits to the ability of market systems to function “automati-
cally” and to coordinate economic activities fairly well. What might make the system
move beyond those limits? How do we understand its behavior when it is performing
very badly? When does it require “stabilization policy” or institutional reforms and
what specifically needs to be done in particular circumstances?
In this lecture, I have tried to persuade you of two things. First, that serious macro-
problems are not a simple result of inflexibilities of prices and, second, that standard
economic theory does not provide sufficient understanding of the role of money and
of monetary institutions in the economy.
I promised in my introduction to explain why I think the development of agent-
based methods of modelling is important. The reason, as I think you might now agree,
is that there are severe limits to what can be achieved with analytical methods in try-
ing to understand the dynamic behavior of the complex system of a modern market
economy.
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